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Abstract
The Gini coefficient is the most popular inequality index. It is based on the sum of pairwise absolute
income differences, which can be viewed as taking a separate sum for each individual of the differences
between his/her income and others’, and then adding up those separate sums. The differences vis-à-vis
people with lower income can be used to construct an individual’s advantage, while the differences with
respect to people with higher incomes generate the individual’s deprivation. Deprivation and advantage
can be weighted differently, producing a whole family of “Gini admissible” personal inequality indexes.
The population average of any one of the latter equals the Gini coefficient. The properties of the personal
inequality indexes explain the sensitivity of the Gini coefficient to transfers in different ranges of the
income distribution. They also throw light on individual views of secular changes in income distribution
interesting for their own sake. For example, throughout the change from a traditional to a modern
economy that gives rise to the Kuznets curve, those in the traditional sector believe that inequality is
constantly increasing while those in the modern sector believe the opposite. Personal views about
polarization and rising inequality, as seen in most high income countries in recent decades, are also
illuminated.
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I. Introduction*
The Gini coefficient has a natural interpretation as the mean of personal inequality assessments. While
that fact is fairly obvious, it was not emphasized in the original work by Gini (1914) and has not been
highlighted since. This paper shows that this straightforward interpretation throws important light on the
properties of the Gini coefficient. It also allows us to better understand individual reactions, as well as
that of the Gini coefficient, to secular changes in income distribution. The latter include the transition
from a traditional to a modern economy analyzed by Kuznets (1955), and the polarization and rising
inequality seen in recent decades in the U.S. and many other countries. Personal assessments of even the
direction of change in inequality may differ between people at different income levels. These results
suggest that our understanding of inequality measurement can be enriched by studying what it may mean
at the personal level.
The Gini coefficient can be defined or interpreted in many ways (Yitzhaki, 1998). For our purposes the
most useful is that it equals one half the mean difference divided by the mean. For a finite population, the
Gini coefficient can be found by taking the sum of all all pairwise absolute income differences, S,
converting to an average and normalizing by the mean. S can be written as the sum across individuals i =
1, .., n of their individual sums of pairwise differences with all other individuals, . The latter can be
used as the basis for a personal inequality index whose average across the population is the Gini
coefficient. For each individual, is composed of the sum of differences with higher incomes plus the
sum of differences with lower incomes. Following Yitzhaki (1979) the sum of differences with higher
incomes may be used to define the individual’s deprivation. That concept is complemented by the
individual’s advantage, derived from the sum of differences with respect to lower incomes.1 Summing
deprivation or advantage across the whole population produces the same total (Yitzhaki, 1979). An
implication is that a weighted average of deprivation and advantage, as well as an unweighted average,
will generate a personal inequality index that will equal the Gini coefficient when averaged across the
population. This means that there is a whole family of “Gini admissible” personal inequality indexes or
GAPIIs. If societies choose to base overall inequality measurement on an average of individual
assessments they may all use the same inequality index, that is the Gini coefficient, at the aggregate level
even if they differ in the weight their members place on advantage vs. deprivation. 2
The personal inequality indexes discussed here may be regarded from a “top down” or “bottom up”
viewpoint. A GAPII could be interpreted as showing how a social planner would measure inequality at
the personal level. This is a “top down” view. An alternative, “bottom up”, view is that individuals, for
whatever reason, assess inequality using a GAPII. Why might individuals do so? One possibility is that
*Thanks are due to Michael Hoy, Stephen Jenkins and Shlomo Yitzhaki for helpful comments on an earlier draft of
this paper. Responsibility for any errors or omissions is of course my own.
1
Yitzhaki (1979) used the term “relative deprivation”, which was introduced by Runciman (1966) to refer to any
case in which some members of a reference group felt deprived compared to other members of their group.
“Deprivation” is used here simply because it is shorter. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) referred to the same concept as
“disadvantageous inequality”, but the term deprivation still dominates in the literature. Yitzhaki (1979) used the
term “satisfaction” rather than “advantage”. “Advantage” is used here as a more neutral term.
2
It may seem too strong to assume that all individuals in a society would place the same weight on advantage vs.
deprivation. With continuous income distributions this assumption could be relaxed to allow weights to differ
across individuals as long as those differences were independent of income.
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they could have interdependent utility functions, such as that proposed by Fehr and Schmidt (1999),
which suggest the use of a GAPII. But one may also appeal to bounded rationality. The difference
between incomes is an unobjectionable indicator of inequality between two people (especially if
considered in the light of mean income). Although we know there are many alternatives, people may
simply think, by extension, that the average of such differences provides the natural basis for measuring
inequality when there are more than two people. That conclusion could be reinforced by information and
computing constraints. As shown in this paper, in order to compute the value of a GAPII the individual
only needs to know the fraction of the population with income above him and the average incomes of
those above and below him. While it is not reasonable to suppose that each individual knows everyone’s
income, he/she might be able to make a serviceable guess at these three quantities.
This paper is related to the large literature on individual attitudes toward inequality. A portion of the
literature attempts to measure attitudes within narrow reference groups, e.g. co-workers or members of
the same occupation. In that context people tend to be averse to deprivation but to like advantage. As
Clark and D’Ambrosio (2015) point out, in the income distribution literature the usual reference group is
broader. In that context, following Yitzhaki (1979, 1982) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999) the general
expectation has been that people will be averse to both deprivation and advantage. There are now a few
empirical and experimental studies that have estimated aversion to deprivation and/or advantage with
broader reference groups. Using the German SOEP survey data, D’Ambrosio and Frick (2007) find
strong aversion to deprivation (but do not report on attitudes to advantage). Cojocaru (2014) finds
significant aversion to both advantage and deprivation using a survey of 27 transition countries. In
experiments with subjects who played a sequential public goods game, Teyssier (2012) found that 40%
were averse to both advantage and deprivation while 18% were averse to neither. While these studies do
not indicate a difference in aversion to deprivation vs. advantage, neural studies find that brain activity
reacts more strongly to deprivation and some authors presume that aversion to advantage is likely weaker
than aversion to deprivation (Clark and D’Ambrosio, 2015).
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. For expositional simplicity we start by working with the
case in which advantage and deprivation are equally weighted. Section II defines the personal inequality
index and derives some of its basic properties. In Section III we then explore how the behavior of this
index helps to explain the sensitivity of the Gini coefficient to income changes in different ranges of a
distribution. The analysis is extended to allow unequal weighting of deprivation and advantage in Section
IV, which shows that the main insights of the previous two sections survive this generalization. How the
personal assessments of inequality vary with income is discussed in Section V and the behavior of those
assessments during period of secular change in income distribution is examined in Section VI. Section
VII concludes.

II. Gini-admissible Personal Inequality Indexes: Base Case
In this section we see how the Gini coefficient can be defined as the average value across individuals of a
particular personal inequality index (PII), and begin to examine the properties of the latter. We do not
seek a basis for the PII in individuals’ personal or social preferences. Our interest is confined to
investigating the implications for personal inequality assessments if individuals use a Gini admissible PII,
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or GAPII. A PII will be termed Gini admissible if the Gini coefficient can be found by taking a simple
average of the values of that PII across individuals.
The Gini coefficient for an income distribution equals one half the mean difference divided by the mean,
as we see in:
1

1
2

2

where is the income of individual i, is mean income, n > 1,
differences, and / is the mean difference.3

⋯

, S is the sum of

A natural but previously overlooked interpretation is that G is the mean value across individuals of a
particular GAPII, :
2

1

where
3
and
4

1
2

2

is the sum of differences for individual i. Equation (3) can be rewritten:
1
2

where is the number of individuals with income less than or equal to , excluding individual i, and
is the number with income strictly greater than , so that
1.4
and
are mean income
among those with income less than or equal to , excluding i, and strictly greater than respectively.
Let be the set of all j such that
Equation (4) can be expressed as:
4′

>

, and

be the set of all j excluding i such that

.

1
2

where:

3

As mentioned earlier, the Gini coefficient can be expressed in many different ways (Yitzhaki, 1998). This is one of
the two principal forms in which it was originally set out in Gini (1914), and is the most convenient for our
discussion.
4
The choice to include individuals who have the same income as i in the lower group rather than in the higher group
is arbitrary but does not affect the results in any significant way.

4

1

5

∈

1

5

∈

is the discrete analogue of the measure of relative deprivation for an individual, which we will refer to
simply as deprivation, proposed by Yitzhaki (1979) for a continuous distribution. It equals the average
shortfall of i’s income below the income of those who are better off, weighted by the fraction of the
population in the latter group. Equation (4΄) shows that is the simple average of and a
complementary measure, , normalized by the mean. We will say that represents individual i’s
advantage compared to people with lower income. Thus from the individual perspective inequality
consists of both deprivation with respect to the better off and advantage over the worse off.
While is a natural personal inequality index to associate with the Gini coefficient, it is not the only
GAPII. As mentioned earlier, and as shown in Section IV, one can define a more general class of GAPIIs
is a special case in which the weights on and
that are based on a weighted average of and .
are equal.
From (4) we have:
is insensitive to a transfer of income within
Proposition 1:
neither group changes as a result of the transfer.

or within

if the composition of

The proposition follows from the fact that transfers of income confined either to or do not alter
,
,
, or
or any other term on the right-hand side of (4). In terms of (4΄), as noted by Yitzhaki
(1979) these transfers have no effect on advantage, , or on deprivation, . The insensitivity of to
such transfers means that it does not respect the Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers, which is a
cornerstone of the theory of aggregate inequality measurement. That an aggregate index that respects the
Pigou-Dalton principle can be built on the basis of personal indexes that violate the principle is striking.
Sensitivity of

to a transfer of income between

and

What determines how sensitive is to a transfer of income between and ? Consider the transfer of
a total amount R from to . Note that such a transfer reduces both and by R/n, as can be seen
and
both fall by R. We will allow R to be negative, so this also
from (5) where
handles the case of transfers from to , which increase and by equal amounts. Using
1

and from (4΄) we have:

6
which allows us to state:
5

Proposition 2: When income is transferred from a person with income strictly above to someone with
income strictly below , falls, while if income is transferred from a person with income strictly below
to someone with income strictly above , rises. In both cases the change in is proportional to the
amount transferred and independent of .
Note that this proposition implies that any given individual is equally sensitive to a transfer from the
group above him to the group below, or vice versa. In that sense, individuals are equally sensitive to
redistribution that does not alter their own income.
Sensitivity of

to a transfer affecting

We also need to analyze those cases where distributional changes affect individual i’s own income. There
are two situations to consider. One is that of a transfer from i to another person j. The other is that of a
transfer from j to i. We will consider them in turn. In this analysis, and in the remainder of the paper
unless indicated otherwise, we will assume
⋯
. This assumption will simplify the
analysis since, for example, it implies that when n is odd there is a unique individual with median income,
, and half the remaining population has <
while the other half have >
. 5 If n is even
there is no individual with =
, but
, which is defined as the midpoint between / and
, again divides the population into two sub-populations of equal size with incomes above and
/
below the median.
Transfer from i to j: Let
and
be initial incomes and consider the effect on
small amount r from individual i to individual j. From (4) we obtain:
Proposition 3a: The effect on
j is given by:
7

∆

7

∆

1
2
1
2

of the transfer of a

of a small transfer in the amount of r from individual i to an individual

1 r,
1 r,

If we could ignore the -1 and +1 in the square brackets on the right-hand side, (7) would say that
irrespective of whether i was greater or less than j, a transfer from i to anyone else would increase if i
was below the median and reduce if i was above the median. This reflects the fact that the main
, individual i is below the median
impact of the transfer on is to reduce and increase . If
and from (5) we see that the increase in will exceed the drop in , since those changes are
and respectively. If
, individual i is above the median and we have the
proportional to
opposite case. The -1 in (7i) means that the rank at which ∆ switches from being positive to negative as
we go up the income scale in the
case is one position higher than it would otherwise be, since the
transfer is going to a person with income lower than the “donor” i, which reduces and a little. And
5

If we assume only
⋯
then there could be multiple individuals with median income and the groups
with income strictly below the median and strictly above the median need not contain an equal number of members.
Consider for example a population with the set of incomes (1, 1, 2, 2, 2, 3).
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the +1 in (7ii) means that when
, ∆ switches from positive to negative one position lower than
and a little.
would otherwise be the case since the transfer goes to a higher income person, raising
Transfer from j to i: Here incomes after a transfer are
Proposition 3b: The effect on
i is given by:
8

∆

8

∆

1

and

. and we have:

of a small transfer in the amount of r from an individual j to individual

1 r,

2
1

1 r,

2

Now the main effect of the transfer is to raise and therefore to increase and reduce , which is
equalizing if is below the median and disequalizing if is above the median. Again the point at which
∆ switches sign as i rises is offset one position by the small impact of the change in on when
and on when
.
Summing up, we can say, somewhat loosely, that an individual perceives a small transfer from himself to
someone else as equalizing if his income is above the median, and as disequalizing if his income is below
the median. If he is the recipient he finds a small transfer equalizing if he is below the median and
disequalizing if he is above the median. Thus the situation in Gini-admissible personal inequality
measurement is quite different from that in the familiar aggregate inequality measurement. In the latter,
the impact of a small transfer on inequality is deemed equalizing if the donor’s income exceeds the
recipient’s and disequalizing if the opposite holds. In the case of Gini-admissible personal inequality
measurement, in contrast, whether the transfer is considered equalizing or disequalizing depends almost
solely on the income of the person making the assessment. Low income people find making a transfer
disequalizing and receiving a transfer equalizing. High income people find the opposite.

III. Explaining the sensitivity of the Gini coefficient to changes in different ranges of the income
distribution
From (1) one may derive:
2

9

3

⋯

(see e.g. Cowell, 2011, p. 114). This provides insight into the sensitivity of the Gini coefficient to
changes in different ranges of the income distribution. Consider a small transfer, r, from individual j to
individual i where i < j. This is an example of what would be called an “equalizing transfer” in
discussions of aggregate inequality. From (9), this transfer will produce a change in the Gini coefficient
given by:
10

∆

7

which also tells us the impact of a transfer from i to j, in which case
0. We see that the impact on the
Gini coefficient does not depend on or , but varies only with r and the difference in income ranks
between i and j.
The fact that the sensitivity of the Gini coefficient to transfers is independent of the incomes of the
transferor and transferee, but depends on the number of people between them in the distribution is one of
the most interesting properties of the Gini coefficient. This property follows directly from those of the
personal inequality index captured in Propositions 1, 2 and 3 above. Proposition 1 implies:
0.

∆

(11

,

.

From Proposition 2 we have:
∆

(11

.

.

And from Proposition 3
.

∆

(12

∆

.

Now, from (1) and (11i), the change in G resulting from a transfer from j to i is given by:
13

∆

∆

∆

∑

∆

)

Note first that
14

1

∆

which is proportional to the number of people between i and j, that is the number of people the transfer
from j to i “passes over”.
Next, to complete the analysis of ∆ , note from (12) that:
∆

∆
2

2
and

Since
15

∆

∆

both equal j – i we have:
1

8

∆ is proportional to the size of the transfer and rises linearly with the number of
Hence, like ∆ , ∆
6
people between i and j. In this case the reason for dependence on the number of people between i and j
is that the effects of the transfer cancel out for and on the one hand, and for and on the other,
where the sums they are based on overlap. The range of overlap includes all
for and , and all
for and . The range where effects that do not cancel out has
1 people in it.
Summing up, substituting (14) and (15) into (13) we have:
16

1

∆

1

2

So we have shown that the mean of the effects on the personal inequality indexes resulting from the
transfer equals the change in G that one would expect from aggregate inequality analysis.
The purpose of this exercise has been to show that the effects of a transfer on personal inequality explain
the impact on G. That the reaction of G is governed by the number of people between transferor j and
transferee i is due to two things: (i) aside from i and j themselves, the only people who care about the
transfer are the individuals between them in the distribution, and (ii) the effects of the transfer on and
cancel out except for those based on changes in income gaps between i or j and individuals in the range
(i+1, j-1).

IV. Unequal Weighting of Deprivation and Advantage
Yitzhaki (1979) defined relative deprivation for a society as a whole, D, as the average of individual
deprivation indexes . He worked with continuous distributions. The corresponding relationship with a
discrete income distribution is:
17

1

We can define overall advantage in a parallel way as:
18

1

Yitzhaki shows that D is related to the Gini coefficient according to:
19
This result might appear puzzling, given that, from (4΄), represents only part of an individual’s
contribution to and therefore to G. The explanation is as follows. The Gini coefficient is proportional
6

Note that the right-hand-side of (15) is not proportional to the number of people between i and j, which is
1.

9

to the sum of differences, S. We can arrange the pairwise differences
making up S in a matrix
M with i indexing rows and j indexing columns. D is the mean of the above-diagonal elements of M
while A is the mean of the below-diagonal elements. Now, the above-diagonal elements have the same
| = |
|. Hence A = D. To get from
mean as the below-diagonal elements in M, since e.g. |
D to S we must therefore double D and multiply by
(to go from an average to a sum). The same
procedure could be used to generate S from A. Thus we have
2
2
or:
20

2

Substituting the expression for D from (20) into (19) we obtain

/ 2

) , that is equation (1).

depends not just
While Yitzhaki’s approach and ours are closely related, his and our are distinct.
on deprivation, , but also on advantage, . While, overall, A = D, at the individual level there is no
such relationship.
rises and falls as we move up through the income distribution from to , and
they do so at rates that rise or fall depending on the shape of the particular income distribution being
examined.
The fact that
has important consequences for our personal inequality indexes. Using (19) and
, G may be found by taking a weighted average of A and D, as in:
21

1

0

1

where we require the weights to be positive. This in turn reveals that there is a family of Gini admissible
personal inequality indexes or GAPIIs of the form:
22

0

1

Hence, while λ may differ across societies, they can nevertheless agree on using G as an aggregate
measure of inequality. 7 In the continuous case this result could be generalized to allow λ to differ across
individuals, as long as the distribution of λ was independent of individual income.
We may ask which of the results derived above for the λ = ½ case survive once
½ is allowed.
Proposition 1, which says that the are insensitive to transfers entirely within the or comparator
groups, survives. The principle is not affected by re-weighting income differences with the and
groups via λ ½ . Proposition 2, which says that when income is transferred from those with income
above (below) to those with income below (above) the fall (rise) in is proportional to the total
amount transferred, R, and is independent of is also unaltered because we still have:
1

7

Note that we are not allowing a negative weight on relative advantage, despite the fact that, as discussed
previously, a few studies of attitudes toward inequality find disaversion to relative advantage. Our assumption is in
the tradition of Yitzhaki (1979, 1982) and Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and is consistent with significant recent
experimental and survey evidence (Teyssier, 2012; Cojocaru, 2014).
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and (6) survives unchanged because in the more general formulation, using (22) we have:
6

1

1

1

Proposition 3 described the impact on of making a small transfer from another person to individual i.
⋯
, the conclusion in the λ = ½ case was that, except for a very small region
Assuming
around the median, a transfer from a higher income person would reduce if was below the median,
and increase if was above the median. Converse results held if the transfer came from a lower
income person. The critical role of the median arose because with λ = ½, advantage, , and deprivation,
, are equally weighted. In general, the critical percentile is given by 1-λ. Thus, for example if one
placed half as much weight on as on , i.e. λ = 1/3, the critical percentile would be 2/3. That means
that a small transfer from someone with higher income would be regarded as equalizing by almost
everyone in the bottom two thirds of the population, but as disequalizing by most of those in the top third.
from the fall in
This occurs because putting a higher weight on increases the equalizing impact on
caused by such a transfer.

V. Personal Inequality Assessments at Different Income Levels
In this section we examine how
varies as rises from to . We provide results for the general
case where λ can take on any value in the interval 0,1 , but note specific conclusions for the case
where λ ½ .
change as we move up through the distribution of income? We continue to assume
⋯
. As we go from individual i to i+1, the absolute income gaps in (3) or implicitly in
for all j such that
, and the corresponding gaps for all j > i fall
(22) increase in value by
How does

will initially decline as i rises from 1, since at the
by the same amount. Hence we should expect that
start there are more people with j > i than with j ≤ i , until some critical point is reached, beyond which
should begin to increase. Formally we have:
Proposition 4:

⋯

If
as

1

,
.

Proof: See Appendix.
Proposition 4 indicates that
falls up to the 1
100th percentile of the distribution and increases
above that. As indicated above, this U-shaped pattern is based on the fact that moving from income to
increases the income gaps with lower income people and reduces those with higher income
income
people by the same absolute amount. The relative impact of changes in the upper gaps compared with
that of changes in the lower gaps is (1-λ)/λ. This means that
will fall more rapidly starting from i = 1 if

11

λ < ½, compared with the λ = ½ case, and less rapidly if λ > ½. Note that if

,

falls up to the

th

50 percentile, that is up to the median, and rises thereafter.
We can also readily identify the value of
well as the value of

for the median individual,
⋯

Proposition 5: If
(i)

1

1

, if n is odd. We have:

,

)
1

(ii) if n is odd,
(iii)

at the bottom and top of the distribution (i = 1 and i = n), as

; if n is even,

is not defined,

1)

Proof: See Appendix.
and . If is non-negative, the highest possible
Proposition 5 allows us to put upper bounds on
is 1
, which occurs when
0. When individuals weight deprivation and advantage
value of
equally, that is when

, the maximum value is . But the maximum value of

ranges from 0, when

λ = 1 and people care only about advantage, to 1 when λ = 0 and people only care about deprivation. In
view of Proposition 4, these maxima also apply to all
up to the 1
100th percentile.8 The upper
bound on
occurs when one individual has all the income and
. In that case
1) ,
which is also an upper bound for all ’s above the 1
100th percentile.
Part (ii) of the proposition is also interesting, in throwing light on the value of the personal inequality
. The latter is based on a weighted average of
index for the “average person”, that is on the value of
, with the weight on
falling with λ. In the focal case with 1/2 , we have:
1
4
Since in any real-world example

1 /

1 , this says:

4
and

In the U.S. today, for household income before tax,

, which yields

0.3

9

, less than the value of the Gini coefficient, which was 0.476 in 2013. We may also note values of
under some familiar continuous distributions.
N(μ, σ), it would equal

would equal

for a uniform distribution, and if

, that is two-fifths of the coefficient of variation.

8

Note that with λ = 1, the (1 – λ)100th percentile = 0, so that
has no falling range.
With the help of quintile share and other data from U.S. Census Bureau (2015) it can be estimated that
1.64 and
0.36 .
9

12

~

will generally not be symmetric around the median. Looking at the
1/2 case
We can see that
will never be greater than 1/2 at the lowest income level, but can be very high at
again, for example,
the top end.
is not bounded on the upper end by 1, unlike the Gini coefficient.
1 is reached
when
3 . That ratio is exceeded in almost all real-world cases. This implies that, in a mathematical
sense, the rich perceive that there is more inequality than do the poor when
1/2, which is not
unintuitive. If you are rich there are relatively few people whose incomes are close to yours, meaning
there is a large gulf between your income and most others’.

VI. Personal Inequality During Secular Change in Income Distribution
can be predicted to behave at different income levels during periods of secular
This section asks how
change in income distribution. We focus initially in each case on the
1/2 case, in which individuals
/

weight deprivation and advantage equally, referring to
simply as , as above. We start with the
Kuznets transformation and go on to the polarization and rising inequality that we have seen in the U.S.
and many other high income countries in the last few decades. The principles at work are explored with
the help of examples, which are intended merely to be illustrative.
Kuznets Transformation
Kuznets (1955) studied what happens to income distribution and inequality in a growing economy where
the composition of output is shifting from an initially large traditional agricultural sector to a modern
sector. The modern sector eventually comprises most if not all of the economy. The consequences for
inequality can be illustrated by considering a stylized model in which individual incomes are uniform
within each of the sectors, higher in the modern sector, and unchanging during the growth process.10 In
this case the Gini coefficient, G, rises until the fraction of the population in the modern sector, p, hits a
critical value, after which it declines. This critical value of p is less than one half. That is because, while
the mean difference has a maximum at
1/2, the mean, which appears in the denominator of the
expression for G, is rising throughout, so G has already started to decline at
1/2.
The behavior of the GAPIIs, that is the s, and G during the Kuznets transformation will be illustrated
here using an example whose implications are shown in Figure 1. It is assumed that income of each
person in the traditional sector is 11.7% of per capita income in the modern sector. This gap is sufficient
for the peak value of G to be 0.49, the value observed in China in 2008 (Li and Sicular, 2014). China is
the most prominent recent example of a society going through the kind of transformation that Kuznets
described. In the early 1980s its Gini coefficient for family income fluctuated around 0.30 (Sicular,

10

Kuznets considered a richer range of possibilities. He allowed unequal income distribution within both sectors
and believed the leading case was one in which there was greater inequality in the modern sector than in the
traditional, or agricultural, sector. He also considered the impacts of changes in the relative income, and of income
inequality, in the modern vs. the agricultural sector over time. In most cases he found that as the relative population
of the agricultural sector declined over time there was an initial increase in inequality followed by a decline.
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2013). This was followed by a rapid rise with later deceleration to the 2008 peak, after which G began to
fall slowly. 11 China may now be past a Kuznets curve peak..12
We will refer to the individual inequality measures of people in the low and high income groups as
and

respectively. Since no one is worse off than those in the low income group,

based entirely on deprivation, while

, that is it is

and is based wholly on advantage. As shown in Figure 1,

is not far above zero. Almost everyone in the society has the same
when the modern sector is tiny,
are very low. The situation in the modern sector is the
low income, so that / and therefore
opposite. Since almost everyone has much lower income than those in the modern sector, the individual
is very high. Now, as development proceeds,
rises monotonically and
inequality measure there,
falls monotonically (and dramatically, in the example reflected in Figure 1). It is as if people in the
traditional sector become steadily more aware of the inequality between themselves and people in the
modern sector as the modern sector grows. On the other hand, from the viewpoint of individuals in the
modern sector, inequality is falling because more and more of their fellow citizens are as well off as they
are.
How does one resolve the conflict when two population groups have such radically opposed views about
the trend in inequality? The Gini coefficient proposes a solution - - take an average of the individual
assessments. Thus in the Kuznets curve example, G is a population weighted average of the values of
and . An alternative would be to take a vote on the question of whether inequality was rising or falling
- - a “democratic” approach. Here the democratic approach would say that inequality rises until p = ½
and falls thereafter. In the example, G says that inequality rises until p = ¼ and falls thereafter. That is
falls faster than
rises, so that averaging
and , even using population weights, places
because
than on the rise in . Thus the Gini procedure of
greater relative importance on the decline in
averaging individual inequality assessments does not correspond to the democratic approach in this
situation, and places more importance on the views of the wealthy.
The difference in the views of traditional vs. modern sector people about the trend of inequality during
development clearly has the potential to create resentment and misunderstanding. Observers sometimes
wonder why high income people seem to be unconcerned about what they view as rising inequality in the
initial stages of development. The suspicion is perhaps that these people turn a blind eye because they
benefit from the process. What we see here is that, from their viewpoint, inequality is actually falling.
This is their honest assessment. Hence we have a “perfect storm” - - numerous poor people who think
inequality is rising and a growing number of rich people who think the opposite. In the real world such a
situation could clearly cause tension.
Our analysis shows that, unfortunately, use of the Gini coefficient could cause confusion about what is
happening to inequality during the Kuznets transformation due to its greater sensitivity to the views of the
high income group. The Gini begins to fall “too soon”. If the behavior of G were used as an input into
11

The National Bureau of Statistics estimates of the national Gini coefficient for family income were 0.491 in 2008
(Li and Sicular, 2014, Appendix A) and 0.469 in 2014 (Qi, 2015).
12
Knight (2014) discusses whether China may be beyond the peak of the Kuznets curve. His conclusion is that this
depends in part on public policy but that there are now strong underlying forces pushing in the direction of reducing
inequality in China.
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policy decisions, this could potentially lead to a relaxation of inequality-reducing measures in a country
where the majority of the population had yet to join the modern sector and still felt that inequality was
rising.
The above analysis would not be affected significantly by moving from the λ = ½ case to λ ½. There
would of course be no impact on the time path of G. Since those in each sector are only concerned either
about deprivation (in the traditional sector) or advantage (in the modern sector) what occurs at the
individual level is simply a rescaling of
and
at each point in the Kuznets process. A majority of
people still believe inequality is rising until p = ½ is reached, and above this point the majority think
inequality is falling. G still has its peak at the same point as with λ = ½ . In terms of Figure 1, there will
be a proportionate shift of the
curve by the factor 2 1
and a shift of the
curve in the opposite
direction by the factor 2 . In the case where λ < ½ the
and
curves will move towards each other,
while if λ > ½ the result will be the opposite.
Polarization
There is much theoretical and empirical literature on polarization (including Foster and Wolfson, 1992;
Esteban and Ray, 1994; Acemoglu and Autor, 2011; Autor and Dorn, 2013; Green and Sand, 2015).
Polarization can take different forms. Without saying so, we have already been discussing one form in
the context of the Kuznets transformation, which has two poles: the traditional society and the modern
sector. At the starting point, with everyone in the traditional sector, there is extreme polarization. As
population shifts to the modern sector that polarization initially declines, but aggregate inequality rises
according to the Gini coefficient, which people in the traditional sector agree with but people in the
modern sector do not. Then there is a phase where polarization continues to decline but changes in the
Gini coefficient turn from positive to negative. Finally, when the modern sector population becomes a
majority, polarization begins to decrease, as does the Gini coefficient, but inequality continues to rise in
the view of those in the traditional sector.
The behavior of polarization, the aggregate Gini coefficient, and personal inequality assessments over the
course of the Kuznets transformation illustrate two important points about polarization and inequality:
i) Polarization and individual inequality assessments may move in opposite directions,
ii) Polarization and aggregate inequality measures may move in opposite directions.
It is clear from the Kuznets case alone that the relationship between polarization and inequality is
complex. The relationship is even more complex in the case of the polarization in labor markets that has
received attention in the US and other high income countries in recent years. In this case the relative
demand for labor shifts away from mid-level occupations to both low-skilled and (especially) high skilled
occupations Other things constant this should result in a shift in labor force composition away from the
middle earning levels toward both high and low labor incomes. Such a shift has indeed occurred over
significant timespans in the U.S., Canada, the UK, Germany and some other European countries
(Acemoglu and Autor, 2011; Green and Sand, 2015). In most cases the relative wages of highly skilled
workers have increased. In the US it has also been found that the relative wages of certain low skilled
occupations have risen (Autor and Dorn, 2013).
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We will analyze the kind of polarization seen over the last few decades in labor markets by first
considering the effects of population shift, that is a rise in the number of individuals at low and high
incomes combined with a reduction in the number at middle income. Subsequently we will look at the
effect of changes in relative incomes as well. As in the Kuznets analysis it helps to consider a stylized
situation. Assume that there are just three income levels in a society and that they display
Numbers of individuals in the three groups are , , and . As in the Kuznets case the GAPIIs of
people in the bottom group and top groups are given by
Also as in the Kuznets analysis the increase in

and

will tend to make

.
and

increase since (from 5i):

(23)
falls due to the population shift from the middle to
However, there is now an offsetting effect because
lower groups, and therefore
increases. It can readily be shown that:
∆

(24)
Now

1 and

∆

,∆

0 as

∆
∆

1 as well, so it is not immediately clear which way the inequality will go.

∆

However, with a positively skewed distribution of income we would have

, so that if half or

fewer of those leaving the middle income group go to the lower group (which is in line with the
experience in the US at least),
and
will decline, as in the Kuznets case.
Turning to the bottom group, from (5ii) we have:
(25)
And it can be shown that:
∆

(26)

Now,
skewness,

1 and

∆
∆

,∆

0 as

∆
∆

1 as well, so again there is ambiguity. Once more appealing to positive

2 is likely. So if half or more of those leaving the middle group go to the top group

(which is of course the same as saying that half or fewer go to the bottom group, as above),
and will fall, which is the opposite of what we found in the Kuznets analysis. This would be the
having a larger effect on
and
than the decline in
.
result of the increase in
and
is sufficiently complex that one may (correctly) anticipate that the analysis of
The analysis of
and
would be tedious. This is not only because
depends on both
and
, immediately
doubling the algebra, but also because for a general analysis allowing λ
about how different weightings of

and

one would need to think

would affect the results. Clearcut results are hard to get.
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Suffice it to say that during polarization, population shift alone may increase, decrease, or leave
unchanged personal inequality as viewed by the middle group.
What about changes in relative incomes associated with polarization? A robust finding across countries is
that the relative income of the highly skilled has risen during observed labor market polarization. With
the incomes of the two lower groups assumed unchanged, from (23) we see that this makes it more likely
and
would rise with polarization, rather than declining as in the Kuznets analysis. This effect
that
would be strengthend if
declined, which could occur as a result of
falling, which is also consistent
could also give
and more
with what is generally observed. From (25) we can see that a rise in
of a tendency to increase, via its effect on , although that could be offset by a fall in
which would
act to reduce .
it is helpful to consider an example
Given the theoretical ambiguity of the behavior of , , and
based on real-world observations. Autor and Dorn (2013) set out the changes in employment shares and
wage rates for six broad occupational groups in the U.S. from 1980 to 2005. As shown in Table 1 here,
the top group, consisting of managers, professionals, technicians, finance and public safety occupations
experienced a 29% increase in employment share and a 36% rise in wage rates over those years. The
middle group shown in Table 1, which aggregates the middle four occupational groups in Autor and Dorn
(2013), had a 22% drop in employment share and only a 9% increase in wages. Finally, the bottom
group, consisting of service occupations, had a 30% rise in employment share and a 17% increase in
wages. These changes provide a dramatic example of labor market polarization.
Table 1 shows rising for all three groups, as do and where applicable. The wage gap between
more than doubling from
the top group and the rest of the labor force expands considerably, leading to
1980 to 2005. The middle group experiences a large increase in deprivation, which is not surprising in
view of its poor wage performance and the large employment and wage increases for the top group. But
the middle group also sees a rise in its advantage over the bottom group, which is due to the increase in
the relative size of the latter group. The 17% wage rise of the bottom group is not large enough to
overcome the deprivation-increasing effect for it of the expansion and large wage increase of the top
group, so its deprivation increases quite a bit.
The above results are obtained with

1/2, of course. But changing λ will not produce a direction of

different from that in , since we do not have a case where either advantage or deprivation
change in
are falling. Reweighting and cannot produce a sum that decreases. This result does, however,
depend on how Autor and Dorn’s original six broad occupational groups are aggregated into three groups.
Autor and Dorn (2013) stress that the only low wage group that sees a rise in employment share is their
service occupations group, and that original group has been treated here as the bottom of our three more
aggregated groups. However, although the original 1980 group with the second-lowest wage, those in
clerical and retail sales occupations, has a small drop in employment share, it, like the service
occupations, shows a relative wage increase. Thus the clerical and retail sales occupations benefit from
wage polarization if not from employment polarization. Again aggregating to three groups, but putting
clerical and retail sales occupations in the bottom category along with the service occupations, changes
, , and
all increase, but
falls. Hence, if λ is sufficiently high, more precisely
results a little.
0.72 or more,
declines between 1980 and 2005. That is, if the middle group is sufficiently concerned
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about advantage it will regard polarization as having reduced inequality in this case. While worth noting,
this result may not affect one’s conclusions much in view of the broad consensus in the literature that it is
likely that λ ≤ ½.

Rising Overall Inequality
In the last four decades substantial periods of rising overall income inequality, as measured by the Gini
coefficient and other conventional indexes, have been observed in a wide range of high income countries
(Roine and Waldenström, 2015). In some cases this reflects polarization, but labelling all increases in
inequality as polarization would abuse the latter term. It is probably best to refer to a broadly-based
downward movement in the Lorenz curve simply as an increase in inequality.
It is interesting to ask what is likely to happen to personal inequality assessments during a period of rising
inequality. Table 2 provides some insight on this question. Using
1/2, it shows at selected
percentiles of lognormal income distributions that have overall G = 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5 and 0.6. These Gini
values span most of the range observed across countries. For reference, the Gini coefficient for household
income in the U.S. was 0.397 in 1975 and rose with little interruption to 0.476 in 2013 (U.S. Census
Bureau, 2015). In the UK the Gini coefficient for equivalized household income was 0.272 in 1977 and
rose to 0.324 in 2013/14 (Office of National Statistics, 2015, Figure 5).
Table 2 shows, first, that falls with income up to the median and then rises, as predicted by Proposition
4. The latter increase, from percentile to percentile, rises with income, particularly at the highest levels.
We see, for example, with an overall Gini of 0.4 that while approximately doubles, from 0.272 to
0.586, in going from the median to the 90th percentile, it then roughly triples to arrive at 1.670 for the 99th
percentile. Second, the table shows that sensitivity to rising inequality is greatest at top income levels.
This is more clearly illustrated in Table 3 which shows high income-low income ratios by percentile,
given different values of G. The P90:P10 ratio rises from 1.62 when G = 0.4 to 1.80 when G = 0.5,
and the P99:P1 ratio rises from 3.85 when G = 0.4 to 5.36 when G = 0.5. The increase of G by 0.1, from
0.4 to 0.5 is roughly similar to the rise seen in the U.S. since 1975, so this is suggestive with respect to
real-world changes in inequality assessments by people at the top of the income distribution. Thus these
results raise the interesting possibility that high income people could have experienced the largest
perceived increases in inequality in recent decades.
An idea of the quantitative impact of allowing
1/2 is provided in Tables 4 and 5, which repeat the
exercises of Table 2 and 3, but with the range of G confined to [0.3,0.5] and alternate values of λ = 0.25
and 0.75 considered. Note first that
1

initially declines as income rises but hits a minimum at the

100th percentile , as predicted by Proposition 4. Next, we can see that raising λ twists the

profile. For lower incomes,

falls but for higher incomes

rises. This means that there is an increase

with λ in the acceleration of

as one goes up the income scale, and a rise in

ratios for such income

percentiles as P90/P10 and P99/P1 (Table 5). The switch from a negative to positive impact of λ on
occurs at P61 for G = 0.3, at P65 for G = 0.4, and at P69 for G = 0.5.
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VII. Discussion and Conclusion
We have seen that recognizing the Gini coefficient as the average of personal inequality indexes generates
rich results. This is partly because a wide range of personal viewpoints about inequality measurement are
“Gini admissible”. The Gini admissible personal indexes, or GAPIIs, are a weighted average of an
individual’s deprivation and advantage. Deprivation is based on the sum of differences between the
individual’s own income and that of people with higher income, while advantage is based on the sum of
differences vis-à-vis people with lower income. Deprivation and advantage are standard concepts in the
literature on individual attitudes toward inequality. However, what happens when they are combined to
form GAPIIs has not been previously investigated.
One remarkable feature of GAPIIs is that they are completely insensitive to transfers of income that occur
only among people who have incomes strictly above those of the reference individual, or among those
who have incomes strictly below that individual. This means that GAPIIs do not obey the Pigou-Dalton
principle of transfers. But the individual does regard transfers from those in the “above group” to those in
the “below group” as equalizing while transfers in the other direction are considered disequalizing, as one
would normally expect. These features help to explain the fact that the sensitivity to transfers of the Gini
coefficient itself depends critically on the number of people with incomes between those of the donor and
recipient. That property can now be seen to result mostly from the fact that the only transfers individuals
with a GAPII regard as affecting inequality at all, aside from those that alter their own incomes, are
transfers that “pass over” them.
Another important aspect is that the relative weights placed on deprivation and advantage can vary across
societies. Thus, in one society, people might care only about deprivation - - they may be said to “resent”
the fact that some others have higher incomes. In another society, they might only care about advantage
- - either exulting in being better off than some others or showing concern for “those less fortunate than
themselves”. And, of course, any weighting between these extremes may be allowed. It is tempting to
imagine that this feature might have something to do with the apparently universal appeal of the Gini
coefficient. If everyone agrees with assessing overall inequality by averaging individuals’ inequality
assessments and that the latter should be based on sums or averages of absolute income differences,
people in all societies can agree that the Gini coefficient is the appropriate measure of overall inequality,
even if the weights placed on deprivation and advantage differ across societies.
The pattern of GPAII values as we go up the income scale is also of interest. As we have seen, starting
from the lowest income, the personal index values fall up to a point - - the median when deprivation and
advantage are weighted equally - - and then rise. With the positively skewed income distributions seen
in the real world, if deprivation is not weighted sufficiently less than advantage, the value of the index
will rise to a higher level at top incomes than it displays at low income levels. The paper ended with a
discussion of how personal inequality assessments may behave during secular changes in income
distribution. We have seen, for example, that in the simplest model people in the traditional sector will
regard inequality as rising throughout the Kuznets transformation, while those in the modern sector think
precisely the opposite. The resulting scope for misunderstanding and conflict seems large. This may
throw some light on the tensions that are observed during periods of rapid modernization and rural-urban
migration in developing countries. A further insight comes from the fact that the Gini coefficient says
that the Kuznets transformation stops being disequalizing well before half the population is in the modern
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sector. This signals that the fact that the Gini is the average of the personal inequality values does not
imply that it is democratic in its judgements. The reason it is not democratic is that higher income people
tend to have numerically larger personal inequality assessments, so that changes in their assessments have
more influence on the average than do changes for lower income people.
Less clearcut results than those found for the Kuznets transformation are obtained for polarization. Under
polarization, population shifts not only to the top but also to the bottom, with a shrinking middle group.
Complex changes in relative incomes can also occur. The result is that there are circumstances under
which people in each of the top, middle and bottom income groups may regard inequality as rising, and
others in which they may all think it is falling, or may have mixed assessments. Given this ambiguity we
turned to the real world for some guidance. In a three-group example set up to parallel the actual
polarization seen in the U.S. over the period 1980 – 2005, we saw that personal inequality rose from the
viewpoint of all three groups in a base case. However, broadening the bottom group led to the result that
the middle group could have regarded inequality as falling if it placed a sufficiently high weight on
advantage compared with deprivation.
Finally, we examined the impact of a general spreading of the income distribution by seeing how rising
dispersion of a lognormal distribution would affect personal inequality assessments. Such a trend raises
personal inequality values at all levels of income irrespective of the relative weights placed on deprivation
and advantage. However it does not do so equally. Unless sufficiently more weight is placed on
deprivation, the increase in inequality is greatest from the viewpoint of those with the highest incomes.
Could this help to explain why rising inequality has begun to get so much attention recently in the global
financial media and such quarters as the annual meetings of the World Economic Forum in Davos? It is
an intriguing question.
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Figure 1: GAPIIs and Overall Gini Coefficients -- Kuznets Curve Case
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Overall Gini Coefficient
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Table 1
Advantage, Deprivation and Personal Inequality Indexes with λ = 1/2, by Occupation Group - Polarization Example Based on U.S. Data, 1980 and 2005
I. 1980
Occupation Employment Mean Wage
Group
Share
(2004 $s)
1. Top

0.316

17.0

3.42

0

0.126

2. Middle

0.585

12.6

0.44

1.38

0.067

3. Bottom

0.099

8.2

0

5.36

0.198

II. 2005
Occupation Employment Mean Wage
Group
Share
(2004 $s)
1. Top

0.409

23.1

6.11

0

0.226

2. Middle

0.462

13.7

0.53

3.86

0.162

3. Bottom

0.129

9.6

0

7.41

0.274

Notes: (i) The mean wage is the geometric mean hourly wage, derived from the mean log hourly
wage reported by Autor and Dorn (2013).
(ii) The Top occupational group is the first category in Autor and Dorn (2013). It includes
managers, professionals, technicians, finance and public safety occupations.
The Middle occupational group consists of the four middle groups in Autor and Dorn (2013):
production and craft occupations; transportation, construction, mechanics, mining and farm
occupations; machine operators and assemblers; and clerical and retail sales occupations.
The Bottom occupational group consists of service occupations.
(iii)

,

, and

are the personal advantage, deprivation, and inequality indexes.

Source: Employment share and mean wage are from Autor and Dorn (2013, Table 1) - - see Note
(i). The other columns are from calculations by the author.
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Table 2
, by Overall Gini Coefficient and Percentile,

Personal Inequality Indexes with

Lognormal Example
Overall Gini:

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

1

0.297

0.380

0.434

0.467

0.486

5

0.244

0.328

0.392

0.437

0.468

10

0.213

0.295

0.362

0.414

0.452

25

0.165

0.240

0.307

0.366

0.415

50

0.140

0.208

0.272

0.331

0.385

75

0.175

0.261

0.342

0.415

0.476

90

0.273

0.427

0.586

0.743

0.886

95

0.362

0.591

0.850

1.135

1.431

99

0.585

1.048

1.670

2.502

3.608

Percentile:

Table 3
Ratios of Personal Inequality Indexes for Selected Percentiles with
Overall Gini:
P60/P40
P70/P30
P75/P25
P80/P20
P90/P10
P95/P5
P99/P1

/ , Lognormal Example

0.2

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.6

1.004
1.030
1.059
1.103
1.281
1.483
1.968

1.006
1.044
1.087
1.155
1.444
1.799
2.757

1.007
1.056
1.112
1.204
1.618
2.171
3.850

1.008
1.065
1.132
1.247
1.795
2.596
5.361

1.009
1.070
1.146
1.277
1.960
3.060
7.430
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Table 4
Personal Inequality Indexes by Overall Gini Coefficient and Percentile with Alternative Values of λ,
Lognormal Example
λ = 0.25
Overall Gini:

λ = 0.75

0.3

0.4

0.5

0.3

0.4

0.5

1

0.570

0.650

0.700

0.190

0.217

0.233

5

0.491

0.586

0.655

0.166

0.197

0.219

10

0.439

0.539

0.618

0.152

0.185

0.210

25

0.341

0.443

0.533

0.139

0.172

0.199

50

0.242

0.332

0.423

0.173

0.211

0.240

75

0.199

0.278

0.361

0.322

0.406

0.468

90

0.242

0.342

0.449

0.611

0.830

1.037

95

0.311

0.452

0.613

0.870

1.248

1.656

99

0.528

0.843

1.266

1.567

2.496

3.739

Percentile:

Note: λ is the weight placed on relative advantage,
. See text.
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Table 5
Ratios of Personal Inequality Indexes for Selected Percentiles with Alternative Values of λ,
Lognormal Example

Overall Gini:

0.3

λ = 0.25
0.4

0.5

0.3

λ = 0.75
0.4

0.5

0.787
0.811
0.837
1.406
1.401
1.382
P60/P40
0.636
0.674
0.717
1.965
1.974
1.949
P70/P30
0.584
0.627
0.677
2.320
2.358
2.353
P75/P25
0.549
0.599
0.656
2.747
2.847
2.897
P80/P20
0.552
0.634
0.727
4.016
4.487
4.941
P90/P10
0.633
0.772
0.936
5.252
6.329
7.548
P95/P5
0.927
1.296
1.808
8.239
11.506
16.015
P99/P1
Note: λ is the weight placed on relative advantage, , in the calculation of the personal inequality index,
. See text.
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Appendix
This appendix provides proofs of propositions 4 and 5.
⋯

If

Proposition 4:

as

1

,
.

Proof: From (4΄), (5) and (22), and using the assumption that

1

A1

∑

∑

1

Hence, (A1) simplifies to:
1

0

which is equivalent to:
1

0

which becomes:
0
from which one readily derives the result that
as

,

1

Now, the left-hand side of this expression can be written:
(A2)

⋯

1
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as:

⋯

Proposition 5: If
(i)

1

1

,

)
1

(ii) if n is odd,

; if n is even,

is not defined,

1)

(iii)

0,

Proof: (i) From (5) and (22), given that
1

1

1

1

1

1

1

(ii) From (5) and (22), if n is odd we have:
1

,

Noting that
1

1

2

If n is even there is no individual with median income since
(iii) From (5) and (22), given that

1

0,

1
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⋯

.

1
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